The Horn of Africa has been the scene of continuing struggles of foreign actors throughout history. The centuries-long Ottoman influence in this region had left its place to the colonial activities of the Western countries. In recent years, several new actors have started to seek influence in the region.
The Horn has been lying in the shores of Gulf of Aden, Bab al-Mandab, and the Red Sea, a route that is one of the most important passages for the world’s maritime trade. Besides, a great deal of oil and natural gas exports from the Gulf countries to the European market are shipped through this route.
From its geopolitical point of view, the existence of this route makes the region a pulling factor for interventionists.
This article aims to briefly explain the links between the Nile Basin politics and the Horn dynamism that the Arab interventionists have recently expanded their influences to the Nile by expressing allegiance to Egypt.
And this information may also provoke people for further research.
For a couple of decades now, some Middle Eastern countries’ interests have been deepened in the Horn of Africa. For example, in 2006, the United Arab Emirates signed an agreement with Djibouti to operate Doraleh, one of the most important ports in the region. While longing to establish a military base at the port of Assab in Eritrea.
The UAE had also made strategic moves to become an influential actor in the Region and used two approaches. These approaches or instruments are control of ports’ operations and the establishment of military bases. As a result of this, Somaliland and Puntland welcomed the Emirati initiative.
Likely to UAE, after the eruption of the Gulf crisis between the Quartet (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt) and Qatar, the involvement of other global and regional actors in the Horn has shown an increment.
Countries like Turkey, China, and Russia are seeking opportunities to cooperate with Eastern African countries.
One can understand that the Horn of Africa is triggering strategic competition for
regional and global actors. The Eastern African countries which have a politically fragile structure, accompanied by unemployment, factionalism, and conflicts of an ethnic origin, should know that they have strategic importance for external actors.
They have also to be more curious about integrating themselves into the multi-polar international system.
Except for Egypt, the Nile Basin riparian countries belong to the East and/or the Horn regions.
Although the change of hydro-political relations in the Nile Basin, some regional or global actors have preferably continued supporting Egypt rather than helping the riparian countries in bringing to end disputes over the Nile Basin.
Despite other involvement in the Horn, the new interventionists from Gulf states have deep diplomatic ties with Egypt. For instance, one of the alliances against Qatar, in Quartet, is Egypt. In this bloc, Saudi Arabia and UAE have been at the forefront. And they have also been seeking to involve and expand their influences in the Horn of Africa.
The great northeastern shield of Africa comprises of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. Especially, these countries are becoming the epicenter of external actors that aspires to get dominance and secure their interests.
Egypt has also woken up to the Horn of Africa recently after several years of lethargy. For over two decades, president Hosni Mubarak had stopped attending African summits after a failed assassination attempt against him in Addis Ababa. The absence of Mubarak in
Continuous summits helped Ethiopia to mobilize the continent around the view that the Nile Waters colonial and post-colonial agreements needed to be revisited.
After a decades-long negotiation among the Nile countries that included Egypt, the Cooperative Framework of Agreement (CFA) on the Nile has come to life, and as a result of it, Ethiopia has moved forward in building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
But Egypt is fearful that the dam gives Ethiopia the capacity to stem the Nile’s flow. Here, TPLF-led ruling party, the former (EPRDF) leadership, even if it is accused of political crimes committed in the past couple of decades, its unprecedented political decision to build GERD that brought a change in hydro-political dynamics, won’t be denied.
Egypt being in poor terms with Ethiopia, it also engaged in a troubled relationship with Sudan which has swung behind Ethiopia on the Nile Waters partly because of its plans to expand irrigation relies on the GERD.
Additionally, Turkey’s plan to build a base in Sudan had also shocked the leaders and politicians of Egypt. Turkey is an active investor in Sudan with plans to open a base at Suakin Island, on the country’s Red Sea coast. Egypt was, therefore, seeking to contain Sudan and Ethiopia, and counterbalance Turkey.
In response, Cairo had cultivated ties with Eritrea, stationing troops there, and was helping with finance the government of South Sudan as a counterweight. Events have indicated that actors of the Horn and the Nile politics have a direct or indirect relationship, in effect.
For the Middle Eastern states, the Horn is a second-order priority, below their concerns
with Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Their interest in Africa is an offshoot of these higher concerns.
What the Gulf States have in common instead is that they provide direct financial aid or budgetary support to the leaders in the expectation that it will be reciprocated. Sometimes, military victory is also regarded as a legitimate political objective (as seen in Yemen). Egypt fears Ethiopia’s economic viability throughout history, especially, hydraulic works propel it into a state of further anxiety to undermine works. The existing situations, indicate that Ethiopia has been stretched between two edges, on one side, it has geographically a great concern on the Horn politics which is vulnerable to its national security, on the other side, it has long-standing dispute towards Egypt on Nile Basin hydro-political issues.
The hard task also awaiting Prime Minister Abiy’s government is, to strategize how to synchronize the shifting premises of his words from enmity to political and diplomatic amity
towards the Horn countries. For this reason, On June 16, 2018, Dr. Abiy Ahmed, the new the reformist leader had visited Mogadishu to initiate an act of ending the history of war and violence between the two neighboring countries. On this occasion, PM Abiy expressed his vision for the region that included: ‘’A common trade area where people, ideas, goods, and products move freely across borders. It is a future where we
work to enlarge opportunities for our people and work for economic security that gives our children and grandchildren great hope.”
Accordingly, Ethiopia’s concern in Horn politics is not a choice rather maintain its national security.
Moreover, peoples who live in the periphery regions of Ethiopia have shared identities and cultures with their respective neighboring peoples. Similarly, the negotiation between riparian countries on Nile issues is also crucial for Ethiopia and its rival.
As history witnessed, the relationship between Egypt and Ethiopia goes beyond ancient times, but they did not utilize this long aging diplomatic amity for good and common benefit. From this point, the negotiation between Ethiopia and Egypt on the Nile waters is seen chimerical. But, as international experiences have shown that disagreements can be successfully managed if diplomatic strategies focus on opening political spaces through communication between leaders of the nations.
Nowadays, Ethiopia and Eretria have good diplomatic ties, while Somalia and Djibouti is surrounded by external actors. Therefore, the government of FDRE is highly expected to revisit its existing strategy towards the Horn and have a responsibility to watch carefully the extensive web of alignments of the Horn countries with external actors.
The Ethiopian Herald May 1/2020
BY TIGISTU AWELU HASSEN
