Last week AMISOM’s central command in Somalia had conducted an evaluation or self-assessment about their mission and how things are evolving on the ground in the battle against the terror group in the country. According to opinions some commanding officers, the war against Al Shaba is going well. The general consensus was that AMISOM is doing fine in Somalia by weakening a once formidable terrorist force that controlled the capital Mogadishu and was ejected out of the main towns thanks to Ethiopian troops that ejected the group in the capital.
However, only a week or so ago Al Shabab waged what was described as a devastating terrorist attack against Somali and foreign forces in some parts of the country. This can serve as an occasion to ask why Shabab forces are still lethal despite repeated announcements that they are suffering final defeat. Why does the war against Al Shabab dragging on while ISIS, a more formidable opponent has been utterly routed in Iraq and Syria. The US is withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan and Syria but keep them on active duty in Somalia.
Commenting on the history of the war against Al Shabab, a study paper said that, “The year 2006 can be seen as a defining year for Ethiopia’s foreign policy. This was the year Ethiopian troops moved into Somalia to dislodge the so-called Islamic Court regime which was established by extremists groups around Al Shabab.
Never before had the Ethiopian government moved into that war-ravaged East African country with such a speed and success. They marched right into Mogadishu, chasing the terrorists and unseating them from the power they imposed by sheer terror. This could be considered the first success of Ethiopian foreign policy in Somalia since the collapse of the Said Barre Regime in 1991. This was however only the beginning of a long and complex story.”
Ethiopia has since provided battle-tested ground forces while the US later on started giving logistic and technological support in intelligence gathering and drone attacks that were effective in undermining the firepower of Al Shabab.
Despite years of counter-insurgency operations by AU-backed and US supported forces, the war against Al Shabab is still dragging as an affiliate of Al Queda which is now rarely mentioned in the international media since the death of Bin Laden the brain behind the emergence and spread of Al Queda. Al Queda is not overtaken by other terror groups such as ISIS with the vision of a global caliphate that has gone up in smokes in Iraq and Syria.
Al Shabab is still claiming control of most of the rural Somalia and has demonstrated its deadly capacity to undertaken lethal guerrilla operations against AMISOM forces in many parts of the country. It is still carrying out deadly operations in neighboring countries such as Kenya. Its attempt to do the same thing in Ethiopia was repeatedly thwarted thanks to preemptive intelligence operations by Ethiopian security.
Despite formidable odds, AMISOM forces, together with international anti-terror coalition forces, have managed to establish, train and empower the Somali defense force whose strategic goal is to take over the command and control operations against Al Shabab once the AMISOM forces would leave the country. This has not actually happened because mainly the Somali defense forces have not yet attained the operational capacity to beat Al Shabab alone. This is of course a realistic assessment and decision by AMISOM commanders on the ground.
The initial objective of Ethiopian intervention in Somalia against Al Shaba back in 2006, was to establish the country quickly after routing the terrorist group in what was calculated to be a quick fix. The study we quoted above says the following on this score, “The quick fix strategy which Ethiopian diplomats initially advanced in their rhetoric did not however prove to be as quick as they thought.
The policy aimed at destroying Al Shaba once and for all and stabilizing Somalia by putting an end to the chaos that reigned there for so long. That was a diplomatic and military priority. As time proved it later on, this foreign policy strategy proved untenable as the Shabab quickly reassembled and put a guerrilla resistance of hit and ran in the rural areas where they had supporters who were misled by their propaganda of Christian invasion that the terrorists constantly hammered on.”
As initial strategy of ejecting Al Shaba quickly did not seem to work as efficiently as it was planned, Ethiopia started to lead a diplomatic campaign to assemble forces opposed to the group both within and outside Somalia. “At the end of a few months, calm seemed to return to Mogadishu while the rural areas were under Al Shabab control. Ethiopian troops and their AMISOM partners later on moved to Shabab territory and dislodged them from many of their strongholds.
In the mean time, Ethiopian diplomacy focused on unifying the anti- Shabab forces within Somalia to form a semblance of legitimate or transitional administration as a precondition for handing over responsibility of governing Somalia to the Somalis themselves and then achieve troop withdrawal. This too, proved easy to talk about and difficult to achieve as the military operation dragged on and Al Shabab seemed to gain in strength instead of weakening. The presence of too many factions and clan loyalties within Somalia with often opposing or contradictory agendas proved the task more difficult if not impossible to achieve.”
It was obvious that Al Shaba’s tenacity resided in its military and strategic flexibility alone. It was also based from the military, logistic and operational supports it was enjoying from international terror groups such as Al Queda and now ISIS. When Al Queda was defeated in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks in the US, and more recently after the rise of ISIS, Shabab shifted its allegiance to more powerful terror groups in its bid for survival. In this sense its allegiance to ISIS was critical in its continued relevance as a terror force in Somalia. There was also a parallel gathering of anti-terror forces at the international levels with the AU and the US taking the lead.
American perception that the fight against Al Shaba in Somalia is part and parcel of its international struggle against terrorism proved right in the subsequent years. However, American involvement in Iraq in particular has shifted critical military and technological resources away from Somalia and into the Middle East. The war in Syria was also requiring increasing American involvement and thus claimed more resources that could otherwise be used in Somalia to finish off Al Shabab as a group and quickly stabilize the Somalia.
As the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria was a powerful back up force and inspiration for Al Shaba, the defeat of the group gave more impetus to the fight against Shabab forces by releasing more money, technology and strategic advice and intelligence for the anti- Shabab forces that were by then operating under the umbrella of the AU.
Ethiopia’s commitment to fighting Al Shaba went beyond providing military and diplomatic solutions and moved also to the internal politics of the country whose fragmentation along clan and tribal lines was perceived as one of the major hurdles in the struggle against Al Shabab terrorism.
Thus a political solution was suggested to change Somalia’s political system by introducing a federalist path that would neutralize narrow tribal or clan allegiances and recreate the country’s unity under a new federal constitution and system.
However this was perceived as a very complex political enterprise given the complexity of the military, political and social situation in Somalia. The above paper says the following on this point, “Although Ethiopian foreign policy was sympathetic to a federalist solution in Somalia, it was also aware of the difficulties that are facing it since Somaliland itself could not gain international recognition despite years of campaigning for it.
See AMISOM… page 24
Some analysts thought the Ethiopian federal experiment could after all be a good solution for Somalia while others expressed skepticism at such a project citing Somalia’s unique clan-based political system as a hurdle against a broader or federalist approach to end the civil war land establish a centralized authority or government. It was therefore difficult if not altogether impossible for Ethiopian foreign policy to engineer a federalist solution to the war and governance.”
Ethiopia’s diplomatic efforts in Somalia have contributed not only to the weakening of Al Shabab’s forces but also helped stabilize the country as a whole compared to what prevailed before Ethiopian troops entered thirteen years ago. Global terrorism is also weakened as a result of US firepower and technology that crystallized post 9/11.
A number of terrorist insurgencies have been dealt with successfully in Iraq and Syria and even in Afghanistan where terrorism still going strong. US decision to withdraw its troops from these countries may not necessarily reflect the situation on the ground. Iraq and Syria may be success stories for US anti-terrorist operations. Afghanistan is clearly a setback and US troop withdrawal followed President Trump’s election promise rather than military success against the Taliban, ISIS or other minor terrorist groups.
There is no timetable for troop withdrawal from Somalia, at least as far official information is concerned. This is a clear indication that the war against Al Shabab is going to take more time and require more resources before the US decides to withdraw its intelligence and air support with its drone attacks. It is however a matter of time before Shabab forces will be finally defeated and ejected from Somalia.
The ongoing Ethio-Eritrea peace process and the stabilization of Sudan and South Sudan on the western flank of the strategic region will certainly help the anti-terror coalition the region as deal a final blow to Al Shabab forces. And Ethiopia’s long years of efforts at stabilizing Somalia and the entire region is bound to culminate with success.
The Ethiopian Herald Sunday Edition 27 October 2019
BY MULUGETA GUDETA
